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“It is very difficult to do business if you have to wake up every day
and say ‘OK, whose laws do I follow?’ . . . We have many countries and
many laws and just one Internet.” – Heather Killen, former Yahoo! senior
vice president of international operations, 2000.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 11, 2000, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris
summoned Internet content provider (ICP) Yahoo! into French courts for
allowing the sale of Nazi memorabilia on its website, Yahoo.com.2 Marc
Knobel, a French Jew, had previously discovered the offensive material
and requested that Yahoo! remove it. Yahoo!, however, refused on the
grounds that doing so would violate its constitutionally protected free
speech. As a result, the company was summoned into French court. The
French court ultimately held that allowing the sale of Nazi merchandise on
Yahoo.com violated French criminal laws prohibiting the sale of Nazi
goods,3 and, because Yahoo.com was either directly accessible to French
citizens (or indirectly through Yahoo.fr, the French portal), the court
ordered Yahoo! to block all access through either portal.4
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme was a
landmark case. It unearthed the complications that arise when multiple
countries seek to regulate a borderless network like the Internet, which has
the capacity to transmit instantly information all over the world—
2. Id.; see also Evan Scheffel, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitism: Court Refuses to Enforce French Order Attempting to Regulate Speech
Occurring Simultaneously in the U.S. and in France, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 549, 549 (2003).
3. Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code makes it a crime to wear a uniform,
insignia, or emblem reminiscent of those worn by either members of an organization
declared criminal under Article 9 of Statute of the International Military Tribunal annexed
to the London Accord of 8 August 1945 or by a person found guilty by a French or
international court of one or more crimes against humanity. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art.
R645-1
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006419560&c
idTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719.
4. Scheffel, supra note 2, at 551–52. The French order required Yahoo! to
(1) eliminate French citizens’ access to any material on the Yahoo.com auction
site that offers for sale any Nazi objects, relics, insignia, emblems, and flags; (2)
eliminate French citizens’ access to web pages on Yahoo.com displaying text,
extracts, or quotations from Mein Kampf and Protocol of the Elders of Zion; (3)
post a warning to French citizens on Yahoo.fr that any search through Yahoo.com
may lead to sites containing material prohibited by Section R645-1 of the French
Criminal Code, and that such viewing of the prohibited material may result in
legal action against the Internet user; (4) remove from all browser directories
accessible in the French Republic index headings entitled ‘negationists’ and from
all hypertext links the equation of ‘negationists’ under the heading ‘Holocaust.’
The order subjects Yahoo! to a penalty of 100,000 Euros for each day that it fails
to comply with the order.
Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1184–85 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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information that can be simultaneously legal in one country and illegal in
another.5 The crux of the Yahoo! case was determining where to draw the
line between two countries seeking to regulate information on the Internet.
Instead of appealing in the French courts, Yahoo! returned to the
United States to request relief in federal court. To abide fully by the French
order, Yahoo! argued that it could not simply block access by French
citizens to the illegal goods, but would have to block everyone’s access,
including American citizens—“Asking us to filter access to our sites
according to the nationality of web surfers is very naïve.”6 Unlike makers
of tangible products (such as motor vehicles), Yahoo! argued that it
provides an intangible product that could not easily be individually tailored
for different markets, as “it had no power to identify where in the world its
‘customers’ were from and thus no control over where in the world its
digital products go.”7 Yahoo! contended that it should not be required to
censor itself in order to comply with French laws. The company stated,
“We hope that a U.S. judge will confirm that a non-U.S. court does not
have the authority to tell a U.S. company how to operate.”8 The district
court overturned the French court’s ruling on the grounds that, while a U.S.
court typically defers to foreign orders, a federal court could not condone a
violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.9
5. Interestingly, the same year that the LICRA trial was taking place, Paul Krugman
wrote a New York Times article in which he expressed concern over the effects the Internet
might have on copyright and tax laws:
[Internet] technology is erasing boundaries—the boundaries that we use to define
intellectual property, the boundaries that we use to define tax jurisdictions. And in
both cases the loss of effective boundaries, though it brings some direct
advantages, threatens something important: the ability of creators to profit from
their creations, the ability of governments to collect revenue. . . . Something
serious, and troubling, is happening—and I haven’t heard any good ideas about
what to do about it.
Paul Krugman, Facing the Music: Napster Is Only the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES (July 30,
2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/30/opinion/reckonings-facing-themusic.html?src=pm (emphasis added).
6. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 6.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 8.
9. The District Court held that
Although France has the sovereign right to regulate what speech is permissible in
France, this Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the protections of
the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs
simultaneously within our borders. . . . “The protection to free speech and the
press embodied in [the First] amendment would be seriously jeopardized by the
entry of foreign [ ] judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in
[another country] but considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press
by the U.S. Constitution.”
Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93 (quoting Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc.,
585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1992)); see also Scheffel, supra note 2, at 554. In 2001,
Yahoo! surprisingly caved in, banning Nazi and Ku Klux Klan goods from all of its sites,
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LICRA appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit,
which, in 2006, reversed and remanded the case.10 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision completely skirted the legal question, reversing purely on
procedural grounds,11 an outcome that illustrates the murkiness that still
exists in grappling with this complex legal quandary. Interestingly, the
court’s opinion noted its uncertainty on the extent of Yahoo!’s “First
Amendment right to violate French criminal law and to facilitate the
violation of French criminal law by others.”12 In other words, the court was
unsure of how far one country’s laws reach into other countries—unsure of
where the line should be drawn between the sovereignty of each when it
came to regulating content on the Internet.13
The legal dilemma presented in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme et L’Antisemitisme became even more complicated when the
activities of American companies operating in Internet-restricting countries
raised more serious questions of domestic and international law. While
saying it will no longer allow items that are “associated with groups that promote or glorify
hatred or violence.” Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185; see also Jennifer Shyu, Speak No
Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 224 (2008). Its
actions, which the company claimed were unrelated to the lawsuit, appeared to be motivated
by Yahoo!’s fears that it would lose substantial assets it had in the French market. See
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 8.
10. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1223–24 (9th Cir. 2006).
11. The Ninth Circuit held that the suit lacked ripeness. While the court acknowledged
the important First Amendment issue at stake, it primarily took issue with the fact that
Yahoo! had already complied with the French order:
There was a live dispute when Yahoo! first filed suit in federal district court, but
Yahoo! soon thereafter voluntarily changed its policy to comply, at least in part,
with the commands of the French court’s interim orders. . . . Until we know
whether further restrictions on access by French, and possibly American, users are
required, we cannot decide whether or to what degree the First Amendment might
be violated by enforcement of the French court’s orders, and whether such
enforcement would be repugnant to California public policy.
Id. at 1223–24.
12. Id. at 1221.
13. The court expressed the situation thus:
What is at issue here is whether it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States for another nation to regulate speech by a United States resident
within the United States on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet
users in that nation. In a world in which ideas and information transcend borders
and the Internet in particular renders the physical distance between speaker and
audience virtually meaningless, the implications of this question go far beyond the
facts of this case. . . . There is little doubt that Internet users in the United States
routinely engage in speech that violates, for example, China’s laws against
religious expression, the laws of various nations against advocacy of gender
equality or homosexuality, or even the United Kingdom’s restrictions on freedom
of the press. If the government or another party in one of these sovereign nations
were to seek enforcement of such laws against Yahoo! or another U.S.-based
Internet service provider, what principles should guide the court’s analysis?
Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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Yahoo! refused to change its operations to accommodate French law, it has
since changed its tune. In fact, over the last decade, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and
Google have come under fire for their cooperation with the Chinese
government and its strict censorship laws, sometimes even providing vital
information leading to the arrest and torture of Chinese citizens.14 These
ICPs have been criticized fiercely by human rights activists, the European
Union, the United States government, and many others for being complicit
in China’s human rights violations of free speech and expression. Yahoo!,
Microsoft, and Google, however, argue that they have no choice but to
comply with China’s censorship laws—otherwise, they risk being pushed
out of the market altogether. Given a choice of two evils, these ICPs
contend that it is better to remain in the market and provide some access
than to leave altogether.15
Should ICPs do the morally responsible thing and leave the market, or
should they stay (or even be allowed to stay) in a market that mandates
their complicity in such a rigid system of censorship?
There is no doubt that corporate complicity in Chinese censorship
raises significant concerns and, moreover, unearths complicated questions
regarding how to tackle the issues that arise from these companies’
operations in the Chinese market. While there have been many proposals
posited by multiple domestic and international sources in the hopes of
addressing the human rights violations and stopping corporate complicity,
this Note argues that none are sufficient to address properly the real
problem. Furthermore, this Note argues that it would be a mistake to
encourage or to force these ICPs to leave the market altogether. No one can
deny the significant human rights abuses that occur in China as a result of
its censorship laws; however, it is important not to implement quick fixes
that fail to target the heart of this complex problem. This Note argues that it
is far more beneficial to the ultimate goal of preserving Internet freedoms
and stopping censorship in China if ICPs are allowed to maintain their
market presence than if they are either forced to leave entirely or penalized
for staying.
Part II gives a brief overview of the unique challenges that the
Internet presents to the international community, and it provides a general
discussion of China’s censorship system, including what these ICPs are
actually doing in China that is raising so many eyebrows, as well as the
domestic and international laws that are being compromised in the process.
14. Brian R. Israel, “Make Money Without Doing Evil?” Caught Between Authoritarian
Regulations in Emerging Markets and a Global Law of Human Rights, U.S. ICTs Face a
Twofold Quandary, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 618–19 (2009).
15. Shyu, supra note 9, at 212; see also Google Censors Itself for China, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm.
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Part III discusses the various solutions that have already been put on the
table to address concerns over corporate complicity in Internet-censoring
nations and argues that the present solutions are inadequate to address the
real problem. Part IV posits that the best and most viable solution available,
while seemingly not the most appealing, is to allow these companies to
continue operating in China. The Note concludes that the tone moving
forward should be one of patience and argues that the type of change many
would like to see in China is very possible even without taking the drastic
step of forcing ICPs like Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google out of the Chinese
market.

II. THE PROBLEM
The ubiquitous nature of the Internet itself sets the stage for the very
distinct problems that emerge from American ICPs’ operations in China.
And while China is not the only country to censor zealously the flow of
information on the Internet,16 it has created what is considered the most
complex and highly developed system of censorship in the world17—a
system that has raised many concerns regarding the human rights violations
that result from its implementation. This next section will briefly discuss
why the Internet presents such a unique problem and then will discuss how
China’s system of censorship is designed, the ICPs’ role in carrying out its
policies, and finally, the domestically and internationally protected rights
that are compromised as a result.

A.

The Challenge of the Internet

Due to its unique decentralized nature, the Internet poses distinct
challenges for nations in their quest to regulate its content, and likewise,
has created an interesting predicament for international relations. Scholars
have posited that international trade has a spillover effect on international
relations, transforming relationships among nations by promoting
interdependence and consequently producing economic stability and peace
in a globalizing world.18 While this is a valuable and fundamental theory on
trade and international relations, it does not anticipate the complexities that

16. Reporters Without Borders recently published an updated list of the worst offenders
of Internet censorship, which included Saudi Arabia, Burma, North Korea, Cuba, Egypt,
Iran, Uzbekistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. Web 2.0 Versus Control 2.0,
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/web-2-0-versus-control-20-18-03-2010,36697.
17. Jan Bruck, Reporters Without Borders Warns Against Internet Censorship,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5349061,00.html;
List of the 13 Internet Enemies, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 7, 2006),
http://en.rsf.org/list-of-the-13-internet-enemies-07-11-2006,19603.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE 24 (1986).
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arise with the Information Age and the advent of the Internet.19
By the 1990s, there was a general concern that the challenges the
Internet presented to governing bodies would ultimately diminish the
relevance of the nation-state all together: “The Internet . . . cannot be
regulated.”20 These concerns have, if anything, intensified as more issues
have been brought to the forefront of international debate. While the
Internet has provided a medium for improving communication in an
increasingly global and interconnected world, it is by its very nature
borderless and can transmit information instantaneously. Likewise, unlike
tangible products that are traded on the global market, content on the
Internet cannot be tailored for individual markets but instead is globally
accessible in an infinite number of locations and is stored in “cyberspace,”
effectively “elud[ing] the control of any single business, individual, or
country.”21 Because information is free-flowing and freely accessible,
serious issues arise when multiple nations attempt to regulate such a
ubiquitous medium, often resulting in conflict as the laws of different
countries collide.22
While scholars argue that trade between nations has a positive effect
on international relations, we are now seeing a clash of interests when
nations attempt to trade (and then regulate) a service such as the Internet. In
this instance, American ICPs are now providing Internet services in foreign
markets, but these foreign countries expect that the ICPs will comply with
their laws—laws that potentially conflict with American laws as well as
international laws. And, as the Ninth Circuit ruling in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La
19. While international trade is certainly a good thing, the effects of international trade
are not always positive, as many scholars have noted in their studies of globalization. See,
e.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (1st ed. 2002).
20. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Nicholas Negroponte, cofounder and
director of MIT’s Media Lab).
21. Shyu, supra note 9, at 216.
22. James Rosenau discusses the increasing interconnectedness of the world
(specifically with the advent of the Internet) and the complexities that arise from it:
People are unsettled by the realization that deep changes are unfolding in every
sphere of life, that events in any part of the world can have consequences for
developments in every other part of the world, that the internet and other
technologies have collapsed time and distance, that consequently national states
and their governments are not as competent as they once were, that their
sovereignty and boundaries have become increasingly porous, and that therefore
the world has moved into a period of extraordinary complexity.
James N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 223, 223 (David Held &
Anthony McGrew eds., 2003). Ironically, the Internet was initially intended to provide a
network free from government restraints, “a new frontier, where people lived in peace,
under their own rules, liberated from the constraints of an oppressive society and free from
government meddling.” GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 13–14.
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Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme illustrates, there is no clear
answer in determining whose laws prevail when there is a conflict.
This conflict raises the question, who does control the Internet? The
uncertainty of this question adds further complexity to an already
complicated matter when dealing with corporations operating in Internetcensoring countries like China. Without a central body in place to regulate
a borderless medium like the Internet, what results is a complex battle of
legal systems with American ICPs seemingly stuck in the middle.

B.

The Great Firewall of China

The Internet has provided a contemporary vehicle for communication
and free speech, but it brings with it great potential for abuse.23 While all
countries censor Internet content to some degree, the Chinese government
has a highly developed system of censorship that levies harsh penalties for
violators.24 In fact, “China reportedly has the largest recorded number of
imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world.”25
China has the world’s most advanced and sophisticated system of
censorship, comprised of technological and legislative controls used to
regulate the flow of speech and information on the Internet.26 Often
referred to as “the Great Firewall of China,” China’s censorship scheme
particularly regulates the flow of information to and from the global
Internet.27 Internet censorship is primarily regulated by the Ministry of
Information Industry, and the State Counsel Information Office and the
Propaganda Department are responsible for determining what content
should be censored.28 There are nine licensed Internet access providers
(IAP) that provide physical access to the Internet and numerous Internet
service providers (ISP) that provide the service connection to the Internet.29
Information flow is filtered at several levels: at the router level; through

23. See Justine M. Nolan, The China Dilemma: Internet Censorship and Corporate
Responsibility,
4
ASIAN
J.
COMP.
L.
art.
3,
1
(2009),
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=asjcl.
24. 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN
CHINESE
INTERNET
CENSORSHIP
3
(2006),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0806webwcover.pdf.
25. Background Information on Freedom of Expression in China, AMNESTY INT’L,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/individuals-at-risk/priority-cases/background-information-onshi-tao/page.do?id=1361025 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); see also Israel, supra note 14, at
618.
26. Miriam D. D’Jaen, Comment, Breaching the Great Firewall of China: Congress
Overreaches in Attacking Chinese Internet Censorship, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 327, 327
(2008).
27. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at 9.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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ISPs; and, as is the focus of this Note, through ICPs. Companies such as
Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft provide the means through which actual
content (words, videos, pictures, sound) is transmitted over the Internet.30
Though there are multiple levels to China’s system of censorship, the ICPs
play a central role in making the entire operation tick.31
Since 1996, China has enacted legislation to tighten control over the
Internet—for example, by regulating news sites as well as imposing
standards on businesses that offer Internet access.32 Its tight net of
censorship has expanded over time and the government is currently
censoring numerous sources such as newspapers, text messages, chat
rooms, e-mails, blogs, and even video games and films.33 Furthermore,
China’s regulations are needlessly vague, seeking to regulate content that
“might harm the state’s honor, cause ethnic oppression, spread rumors,
disrupt social stability, spread pornography, undermine state religious
policy, or preach the beliefs of evil cults.”34 Instead of directly regulating
ICPs, the Chinese government saves the legwork by requiring all ICPs to
be licensed to operate, and then makes the ICPs responsible for preventing
the transmission of politically objectionable or illegal information.35 To
stay in line with Chinese laws, ICPs individually develop and maintain
keywords and phrases that must either be blocked or monitored.36 This
system often leads to overcensoring, because China’s overly broad
guidelines make it unclear as to what is or is not acceptable content.37
30. Id. at 12.
31. Kari Huus, Navigating China’s Web of Censors, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36041417/ns/technology_and_science-security/.
32. Interim Provisions Governing the Management of the Computer Information
Networks in the People’s Republic of China Connecting to the International Network
(promulgated by Decree No. 195 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
Feb. 1, 1996, effective Feb. 1, 1996) P.R.C. Laws, available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ipgtmotcinitproccttin1488/ (“strengthening the
control on the computer information networks connecting to the international network”); Jill
R. Newbold, Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S Corporations for Selling China
Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 503, 510 (2003);
Administration of Internet News Information Services Provisions (promulgated by the Press
Office of the State Council and Ministry of Information Industry, Sep. 25, 2005, effective
Sep. 25, 2005), P.R.C. Laws, available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/200509-25/18571.shtml (China) (“formulated in order to standardize internet news information
services, satisfy the needs of the public for internet news information, safeguard national
security and public interests, protect the lawful rights and interests of internet news
information service units and promote the healthy and orderly development of internet news
information services”).
33. Michael Wines et al., China’s Censors Tackle and Trip over the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1.
34. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 331 (quotations omitted).
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at 12.
36. Id. at 14–15.
37. Id. at 14.
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Consequently, ICPs are not victims of the Chinese censorship system, but
they are in fact direct participants in censoring Chinese citizens, a situation
which has left these companies vulnerable to criticism, as well as liability,38
for cooperating with Chinese censorship laws.

C.

Domestic and International Laws on Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech is domestically and internationally recognized as a
fundamental human right. The United States considers this right to be so
paramount that free speech is enumerated in the very first amendment of
the Constitution, providing for strong protections against government
infringement of speech: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press….”39 This right is considered so central
to American values that Congress proposed the Free Speech Protections
Act of 2009 to provide added protection to American citizens’ right to free
speech, calling the First Amendment “one of the most basic protections in
our Constitution.”40 While First Amendment rights to free speech are
certainly not limitless, the United States is deemed to have some of the
world’s most liberal protections of speech.41
Freedom of speech is also internationally recognized as a fundamental
human right. This international recognition is enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on
Civil Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 19 of the UDHR provides that
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.42

The UDHR was adopted in 1948 and participating nations committed
themselves to promote freedom of speech as a fundamental universal right.
Ironically, China voted for the UDHR, but because it is not a treaty, the
UDHR is not legally binding on any nation.43 The UDHR does, however,
stand as an emblem of a universally recognized right to freedom of speech.
The ICCPR, on the other hand, is a multilateral treaty adopted in 1966
38. See Israel, supra note 14, at 620.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. 155 CONG. REC. S2342–43 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2009/s449.html.
41. Exceptions to First Amendment guarantees include obscenity regulations, copyright
protections, and regulations on commercial speech. See generally HENRY COHEN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 95-815A, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2004).
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III),
at
art.
19
(Dec.
10,
1948),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19 (emphasis added).
43. Nolan, supra note 23, at 8.
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that compels nations to protect, among other rights, freedom of speech.44
The ICCPR recognizes free speech as a human right; however, it also
prescribes limitations to be placed on the right. These limitations include
“respect of the rights or reputations of others,” “the protection of national
security or of public order . . . or of public health or morals,” or for
prohibiting war propaganda and any national, racial, or religious hatred that
can create hostility or a threat of violence.45
However, while the ICCPR provides for limitations on free speech in
specified circumstances, it requires that any regulations passed that limit
free speech must be (1) prescribed by law; (2) implemented in order to
protect the rights or reputations of others or to safeguard national security;
and (3) necessary to achieve that purpose.46 Furthermore, even if a
government presents a legitimate interest, the ICCPR requires that the
scope of its application be limited strictly to that which is necessary to
achieve its purpose, namely, “protecting national security, the right to
freedom of expression and information can be restricted only in the most
serious cases of a direct political or military threat to the entire nation.”47
The UDHR and ICCPR provide formal recognition of freedom of
speech as a fundamental right, but the actual scope of this right is
delineated by each nation, causing variations from country to country. In
the case of China, while it has been criticized for egregious human rights
violations regarding freedom of speech, China contends that censorship is
necessary to promote the nation’s stability and maintain security by
avoiding political upheaval.48 However, China’s censorship laws are not
prescribed by law. In fact, Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China actually provides for freedom of speech.49 Likewise,
while China’s desire to safeguard national security appears to comport with
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, its censorship laws are extreme and overly
broad—resulting in the censoring of hundreds of political names and terms
and even benign phrases like “cat abuse” and “mascot”50—and its penalties
44. China has signed the treaty, but it has not yet ratified it and thus is not bound by its
provisions. Id. at 9.
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N.
Doc.
A/14668,
at
art.
19–20
(Dec.
16,
1966),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668English.pdf [hereinafter ICCPR].
46. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 3; Nolan, supra note 23, at 9–10.
47. Nolan, supra note 23, at 10 (quoting Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
Resolution 1993/45, Reference E/CN.4/1995/32, ¶ 48 (Dec. 14, 1995) (by Abid Hussein)).
48. See D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 336.
art.
35
(1982)
(China),
available
at
49. XIANFA
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
50. The Great Firewall of China: Keywords Used to Filter Web Content, WASH. POST
(Feb.
18,
2006),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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for violators are disproportionate to the actual offense.51 While every
country censors to a certain degree in the name of national security,
China’s censorship laws are on the extreme end of the spectrum, imposing
severe penalties for individuals who violate its laws.
While China has been heavily criticized for the multiple human rights
violations that result from its system of censorship, its policies are not
executed solely by the Chinese government. Instead, China relies on
outside entities such as ICPs to promote its censorship goals, adding further
complications to the matter.

D.

Corporate Complicity

Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Google have come under fire for being
complicit, albeit in varying degrees, with Chinese censorship laws. Despite
claims that their hands are tied in the matter and that they are helpless
against China’s demands, by helping China carry out its censorship
policies, these ICPs are running afoul of both domestically and
internationally recognized protections of free speech. Yahoo! is perhaps the
biggest offender; however, all three ICPs have been criticized for their
roles in China.
Yahoo! was the first to enter the Chinese market, developing the
search engine Yahoo! China in 1999.52 Three years later, it signed a
Chinese ethics pledge—the only ICP of the three to do so—agreeing to
follow Chinese Internet regulations and to censor information that may
jeopardize security or stability.53 Google also established a censored
version of its Chinese domain, Google China (google.cn), in January of
2006, after years of its google.com portal being “sporadically blocked” by
the Chinese government.54 By entering China’s market, Google escaped the
fate of being censored by Chinese filters, but was required to comply with
China’s laws in filtering keywords or phrases from its searches.55 Microsoft
dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554.html. Roughly fifteen percent of blocked
terms are related to sex, while the rest are political terms, including names of political
leaders, intellectuals, dissidents, and terms such as “freedom” and “democracy.” A List of
DIGITAL
TIMES,
Censored
Words
in
Chinese
Cyberspace,
CHINA
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2004/08/the-words-you-never-see-in-chinese-cyberspace/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
51. Such penalties include arrest, long-term detainment, and (reportedly) torture. Nolan,
supra note 23, at 7.
52. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 332.
53. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24, at 12.
54. Kristopher Huynh, Google Enters the Chinese Market, Practising Enlightened SelfCensorship,
CSR
GROUP
(Feb.
26,
2006),
http://www.thecsrgroup.com/cblog/index.php?/archives/17-Google-enters-the-Chinesemarket,-practising-enlightened-self-censorship.html; Google Censors Itself for China, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm.
55. See Google Censors Itself for China, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006),
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entered China’s market with its MSN search engine, establishing MSN
China in mid-2005.56
As a result of their presence in the Chinese market, these ICPs have
been linked to the controversial arrests of several Chinese dissidents. Some
of these arrests have allegedly resulted in torture, prolonged detainment,
and even death.57 In 2005, a Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, received ten years
in prison for leaking “state secrets” after sending a Communist document to
an overseas prodemocracy website through his personal Yahoo! account.58
The Chinese government discovered Shi Tao’s identity by demanding his
personal information from Yahoo!’s Hong Kong office (which readily
handed over the information).59 In the same year, Microsoft’s MSN shut
down the popular blog maintained by Chinese journalist Zhao Jing after
Chinese authorities requested that it be deleted.60 Finally, in 2002, Wang
Xiaoning was arrested for publishing prodemocracy material after Yahoo!
handed over his information—an arrest which resulted in Wang’s wife
suing Yahoo! for “corporate irresponsibility.”61 These examples, while far
from daily occurrences, serve as an important reminder of the profound
consequences of ICP complicity in China’s extreme system of censorship.
Though in varying degrees, all three companies have caved to China’s
demands, and consequently these companies face global criticism for the
resulting human rights violations and may face liability for their actions. As
a result of their operations in China, these corporations are being haled into
American courts by Chinese citizens for violations of U.S. law,62 and the
problem leaves many questioning what can be done to stop corporate
complicity all together.

III. PROPOSALS ADDRESSING CORPORATE COMPLICITY
Numerous avenues have been explored in the effort to hold ICPs
responsible for their complicity in human rights violations in China. First,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm.
56. David Cohn, MSN Enters Chinese Market, WIRED NEWS REP. (May 26, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/05/67651.
57. Israel, supra note 14, at 620.
58. Case
Highlight:
Shi
Tao
and
Yahoo,
HRIC,
http://www.hrichina.org/public/highlight/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
AM.
CENTER,
59. China:
Shi
Tao,
PEN
http://www.pen.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/764/prmID/172 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
60. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 333. Moreover, Jing’s website was located on servers in
the United States, not China, creating more concern regarding MSN’s actions. Surya Deva,
Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares for the Global Compact
or the Global Online Freedom Act?, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 255, 270 (2007).
61. Wang
Xiaoning
Multimedia
Informaiton,
JOE
INVESTOR
ONLINE,
http://www.joeinvestoronline.com/library/Wang-Xiaoning.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
62. Case Highlight, supra note 58.
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foreigners have sued these ICPs in American courts under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting human rights violations in China.
Second, the Global Online Freedom Act, the Global Network Initiative, and
the Global Compact have been developed to discourage further complicity.
However, at least at the present time, none of these options have proven
effective in holding these companies liable for their operations in China.

A.

International Law

Traditionally, violations of international law have been imposed on
state actors—but, since the Nuremberg Trials during World War II, liability
has been imposed on individual actors as well.63 However, there has been
an increasing push to apply international law to corporations like Yahoo!,
Google, and Microsoft. Since corporations have grown and entered the
global market, their operations began to have more serious ramifications on
the global market and the world. As corporations become more powerful,
many argue that because these entities look and act more like states than
mere companies, they should be treated as such under international law.
Consequently, these ICPs have been sued in American courts under the
ATS (also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act)64 for the human rights
violations that have occurred as a result of their operations in China.
The ATS was enacted in 1789 but remained largely unused until
198065 when Filartiga v. Pena-Irala66 held that the Act provided
jurisdiction in federal courts over tort suits brought by aliens (and only by
aliens) for violations of “the law of nations” (i.e., customary international
law).67 However, the language of the ATS does not explicitly address who
may be held liable for violations of international law—that is, while
international law has since recognized that individuals, as well as states,
may be held liable for violations under international law, it is not clear
whether corporations should be considered “individuals” under the ATS.68
Though corporate liability under the ATS is still unsettled, many courts

63. “The singular achievement of international law since the Second World War has
come in the area of human rights, where the subjects of customary international law—i.e.,
those with international rights, duties, and liabilities—now include not merely states, but
also individuals.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”).
65. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115–16.
66. 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116.
68. See id. at 118 n.10; Chimène I. Keitner, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Another
Round in the Fight over Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, ASIL INSIGHTS,
Sept. 2010, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.asil.org/insights100930.cfm.
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have assumed that corporations can be held liable under the ATS.69 On
September 17, 2010, however, the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum may have thrown a major wrench in finding corporate liability
under the ATS. Kiobel dealt with claims by Nigerian residents against Shell
Transport and Trading Company PLC for aiding and abetting the Nigerian
government in human rights violations during oil exploration.70 The Second
Circuit (relying on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain71) held that corporations could
not be held liable under the ATS because they are not individuals as
understood under customary international law—that while domestic law
might recognize corporations as individuals in terms of conferring liability,
international law has not done so.72
By conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a limited number of
offenses defined by customary international law, the ATS requires
federal courts to look beyond rules of domestic law—however wellestablished they may be—to examine the specific and universally
accepted rules that the nations of the world treat as binding in their
dealings with one another.73

In its reasoning, the majority noted, for example, that a proposal at the
Rome Conference to grant jurisdiction over corporations in the
International Criminal Court was “soundly rejected.”74 Likewise, it found
that “no corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability under the
customary international law of human rights . . . .”75 While Kiobel has not

69. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
plaintiff properly stated a claim under the ATS for violations of international law against a
corporate defendant); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“In addition to private individual liability, we have also recognized corporate defendants
are subject to liability under the ATS and may be liable for violations of the law of
nations.”) (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)); Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that state action was not
required to find liability under the ATS); Kadic v. Karadži, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its
reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals.”). But see Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(“Courts have also divided over whether and under what circumstances a private person or
corporation can violate customary international law.”); Mark Hamblett, 2nd Circuit Rejects
Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Act Cases, LAW.COM (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202472226419.
70. The claims included “aiding and abetting (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against
humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and
detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced
exile; and (7) property destruction.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123.
71. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
72. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. at 121.
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yet been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,76 many believe that its
holding will not only have a significant impact on ATS cases brought in the
Second Circuit, but also that it will have “broad-reaching application” in
many other courts.77
What does this case mean for ICPs in China? Previously, some
Chinese victims of human rights violations have brought suit against
Yahoo!, Google, and MSN under the ATS and have met with some
success.78 After Kiobel, however, it appears that (at least for now) this door
may very well be closing. Therefore, while there is a great deal of support
for imposing international law and human rights obligations on
corporations, Kiobel may have foreclosed a very viable mechanism through
which to find corporations liable under the ATS. For now, it appears that it
is up to the governments where corporations are domiciled to deal with the
sticky legal situations that their corporations face.

B.

The Global Online Freedom Act

In response to mounting criticism regarding Yahoo!, Google, and
Microsoft’s cooperation with China’s censorship laws, the U.S. House of
Representatives held a joint committee hearing in 2006 with executives
from Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft to discuss their business practices in
China. As a result of this hearing, Congress proposed the Global Online
Freedom Act of 2006 (GOFA) on February 16, 2006.79 The Act (later reintroduced in 200780) was intended to create “corporate responsibility of [ ]
companies to protect and uphold human rights”81 and to provide for civil
and criminal penalties for noncompliance.82 In other words, GOFA aimed
to bring the ICPs’ business practices in line with internationally recognized
rights to freedom of speech.83 This Act was an ambitious attempt by the
U.S. government to confront issues with corporate business practices in
other countries; however, GOFA is not an appropriate means of
confronting the problem, for reasons that will be discussed below, and thus
likely will not become law. The primary goal of the Act, if implemented,

76. The Second Circuit denied the plaintiff’s motion for rehearing en banc on February
4, 2011. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2011 WL 338048 (2d Cir. 2011).
77. See, e.g., Hamblett, supra note 69 (internal quotation omitted).
78. For example, Yahoo! settled an ATS case brought against it that led to the arrest of
Shi Tao. Families of Shi Tao and Wang Xiaoning (Yahoo! Inc), WORLD ORG. FOR HUM. RTS.
USA,
http://www.humanrightsusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
15&Itemid=35 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
79. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006).
80. See D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 329.
81. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006 § 2(15).
82. Id. § 207.
83. Id. § 2(1).
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presents extraterritorial concerns that the United States must take into
consideration. The intent of GOFA was “[t]o promote freedom of
expression on the Internet [and] to protect United States businesses from
coercion to participate in repression by authoritarian foreign governments .
. . .”84 In essence, by passing the Act, the United States would be
attempting to regulate business practices that occur outside its borders.
While traditionally states have jurisdiction to ensure that nonstate actors are
complying with international law within their borders, “extraterritoriality”
refers to actions by a state that regulate its citizens beyond its borders.85
The United States has long followed a presumption against
extraterritoriality.86 As the recent district court decision in Yahoo!, Inc. v.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme illustrates, the United
States is very hesitant to extend its laws beyond its borders particularly
when it comes to regulating the Internet. The court there stated:
In a world in which ideas and information transcend borders and the
Internet in particular renders the physical distance between speaker and
audience virtually meaningless, the implications of this question go far
beyond the facts of this case. The modern world is home to widely
varied cultures with radically divergent value systems. There is little
doubt that Internet users in the United States routinely engage in
speech that violates, for example, China’s laws against religious
expression, the laws of various nations against advocacy of gender
equality or homosexuality, or even the United Kingdom's restrictions
on freedom of the press. If the government or another party in one of
these sovereign nations were to seek enforcement of such laws against
Yahoo! or another U.S.-based Internet service provider, what
principles should guide the court’s analysis?87

Likewise, there is still a question of the extent to which international law
permits a country to apply its laws to corporations when they operate
outside of the country’s own borders. While the Human Rights Committee
has not explicitly prohibited extraterritorial regulations,88 it also has not
84. Id. pmbl.
85. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 338; see also Nolan, supra note 23, at 12.
86. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 338. David Held’s discussion of the classic regime of
sovereignty reflects this presumption against extraterritoriality. He stated,
The classic regime of sovereignty highlights the development of a world order in
which states are nominally free and equal; enjoy supreme authority over all
subjects and objects within a given territory; form separate and discreet political
orders with their own interests . . . ; engage in diplomatic initiatives but otherwise
in limited measures of cooperation; regard cross-border processes as a ‘private
matter’ concerning only those immediately affected . . . .
David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?, in
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION
DEBATE 162, 162–63 (2003).
87. Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
88. For example, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted Article 2(1) of the
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considered this question in the context of extraterritorial corporate
actions.89 Therefore, if the United States should decide that extraterritorial
regulation is necessary in this situation, it is not entirely clear that GOFA’s
extraterritorial encroachments are justified under international law.
Furthermore, even if the United States decided to impose
extraterritorial regulations on its corporations (and its actions were not
prohibited under international law), GOFA runs the risk of imposing
American views of free speech on the rest of the world. The Act gives the
President full power to designate countries as being “Internet-restricting”
based on a number of factors including the extent that the country filters
content and the number of dissidents prosecuted.90 The President is then
expected to provide a yearly report of countries that have made the list.91
GOFA would also provide for an Office of Global Internet Freedom, which
would “serve as the focal point for interagency efforts to protect and
promote freedom of electronic information abroad . . . .”92 The aims of the
Office would be to (1) create a global strategy to combat state-sponsored
censorship; (2) identify and publicize keywords, terms, and phrases
censored by each Internet-restricting country; (3) work with companies
operating abroad to develop a voluntary code of minimum corporate
standards; and (4) advise congressional committees on whether further
legislative action is needed to keep the Act relevant.93 While GOFA seeks
to bring its companies in line with the human rights recognized in the
UDHR, it does so in a manner that risks imposing Americanized notions of
free speech on other countries because the Act gives complete discretion to
the President and a government agency without any input from other
international bodies.
Every country provides varying degrees of protection for speech on
the Internet. While China is on the extreme end of the spectrum (having
made Reporters Without Borders’s 2006 “List of the 13 Internet
Enemies”),94 the United States is toward the other end, with some of the
ICCPR (regarding a nation-state’s duty to ensure individual rights) as conferring jurisdiction
on the nation-state to “anyone within the power or effective control of that State party even
if not situated within the territory of the State party.” U.N. Comm. on Human Rights,
General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 12, 2004),
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ca12c3a4ea8d6c53c1256d500056e56f/$FILE/G044130
2.pdf; Nolan, supra note 23, at 13 (citation omitted).
89. Nolan, supra note 23, at 13.
90. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. §§ 105(a)(1), 103(a)
(2006).
91. Id. § 105(b)(1).
92. Id. § 104(b)(1).
93. Id. § 104(2)–(7).
94. List of the 13 Internet Enemies, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 7, 2006),
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more liberal approaches to Internet censorship.95 But even the Internet in
the United States is far from unregulated, and, according to OpenNet
Initiative, “the United States may be among the most aggressive states in
the world in terms of listening to online conversations.”96 Furthermore,
China is not the only country whose laws clash with the United States’
regarding censoring information on the Internet. As illustrated in the
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, the First
Amendment protections in the U.S. Constitution conflicted with French
laws prohibiting the sale of Nazi merchandise.97 Likewise, Australia has
decided to join China in implementing a government-mandated system of
censorship where its plans to filter content relating to pornography,
bestiality, rape, and child pornography have been highly criticized for
being too expansive, potentially resulting in the unwarranted blockage of
content with “strong social, political and/or educational value.”98
What constitutes “protected speech” is very much reflective of a
nation’s culture, politics, and history; even China’s extreme censorship
policies are a response to the country’s deep concern with maintaining
stability in such a densely populated nation.99 Since cultural, political, and
historical attributes play into every nation’s concept of protected speech, it
should not be up to one country to decide what should or should not
constitute protected speech. GOFA requires the President of the United
States to determine which countries are “Internet-restricting,” but it does
not set out any substantive means of making this determination. It only
dictates that “[a] foreign country shall be designated as an Internetrestricting country if the President determines that the government of the
country is directly or indirectly responsible for a systemic pattern of
substantial restrictions on Internet freedom . . . .”100 “Substantial
restrictions” is not clearly defined, leaving the President to make that
judgment. Without any concrete notions of free speech to draw upon,

http://en.rsf.org/list-of-the-13-internet-enemies-07-11-2006,19603.
95. OpenNet Initiative lists the United States as lacking “widespread technical Internet
filtering at the state level . . . .” Internet Filtering in the United States and Canada in 20062007, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://opennet.net/studies/namerica2007 (last visited Apr. 14,
2011).
96. Id.
97. Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
98. Jessica Guynn, Google, Yahoo Object to Proposed Internet Censorship in Australia,
TIMES
TECH.
BLOG
(Mar.
23,
2010,
9:58
AM),
L.A.
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/03/australia-internet-censorship-googleyahoo.html.
99. D’Jaen, supra note 26, at 336.
100. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4708, 109th Cong. § 105(a)(2) (2006)
(emphasis added).
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granting such broad discretion risks unduly imposing American notions of
“protected speech” without deeper considerations of the cultural reasoning
behind other notions of free speech.
GOFA creates the potential for bad blood between China and the
United States at a time when their relationship is already tenuous. One of
the considerations for implementing extraterritorial regulations is comity,
or legal reciprocity:
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.101

When creating legislation that has extraterritorial effects, it is important to
be mindful of the conflicts that can ensue when one nation attempts to
extend its laws and regulations beyond its own borders.
The current relationship between China and the United States has
been described as “inextricably intertwined, locked in a kind of codependency . . . .”102 China holds about $800 billion of America’s debt,103
while the United States is China’s most important market for its goods.104
Both economies are so completely entangled and dependent on the other
that they essentially control each other’s fate—China “can pull the rug out
from under [America’s] economy only if they want to pull the rug out from
under themselves.”105 While China does not want to jeopardize its
relationship with the United States, the United States also has an interest in
maintaining a good relationship with China.
Passing GOFA, however, could strain that relationship. President
Obama’s visit to China in November 2009 and his interactions with
Chinese officials reflected an unwillingness to put such an important
relationship on the line in order to address China’s censorship laws. When
asked by a Chinese student whether the United States would “respect” the
differences between American and Chinese censorship laws, Obama
responded that “it’s very important for the U.S. not to assume what is good
101. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1985).
102. Keith B. Richburg, For U.S., China, Uneasiness About Economic Co-Dependency,
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/15/AR2009111502435.html.
103. Id. A more recent Washington Times article indicates that China may hold closer to
$1.7 trillion in U.S. debt. China Holds More U.S. Debt Than Indicated, WASH. TIMES (Mar.
2, 2010), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/02/chinas-debt-tous-treasury-more-than-indicated/.
104. Richburg, supra note 102.
105. Id. (quoting Kenneth Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution).
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for us is good for you.”106 Likewise, newspaper headlines noted Obama’s
“gentle critique” of China’s human rights violations.107 Obama’s visit to
China reflected a general understanding that the United States’ relationship
with China is too vital to jeopardize by passing legislation that has the great
potential to upset an already strained situation.
GOFA is commendable in its attempts to address the serious issue of
American corporations’ complicity in Chinese censorship; however, it is
not likely to become law for important reasons. GOFA raises
extraterritorial concerns that must be carefully considered. As it is currently
written, GOFA lacks an inherent understanding of the cultural, political,
and historical motives behind every nation’s concept of protected speech.
While the relationship between Internet censorship and human rights is an
important topic for the United States GOFA is an inappropriate means to
address those issues, and its passage could threaten to disrupt an already
tenuous relationship between two of the world’s super powers.

C.

Global Network Initiative

Since the Global Online Freedom Act was last introduced in 2007, it
has not yet been passed into law, and, for reasons already stated, the United
States government does not appear to be in the position to address Internet
censorship problems at this time. Yet ICPs have still found themselves
between a rock and a hard place in trying to maintain market presence
internationally while avoiding human rights violations as a result of their
business relationships. In October 2008, spurred at least in part by their
predicament in China, American ICPs teamed up with nongovernment
organizations, investors, and scholars. This two-year collaboration resulted
in the development of an industry-wide code of conduct called the Global
Network Initiative (GNI).108 The GNI addresses the “increasing
government pressure [companies face] to comply with domestic laws and
policies in ways that may conflict with the internationally recognized
human rights of freedom of expression and privacy” and is intended to
advance a global response toward protecting and advocating freedom of
expression and privacy.109
106. Aileen McCabe, Obama Gives Human Rights, Internet Censorship Centre Stage in
(Nov.
16,
2009),
China,
CANADA.COM
http://www.canada.com/news/Obama+gently+chides+China+cyber+censorship/2226819/sto
ry.html.
107. See, e.g., Peter Nicholas, Obama Chides China on Human Rights, L.A. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2009), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-obamashanghai16-2009nov16,0,6953879.story.
108. Rebecca MacKinnon, The Global Network Initiative, CIRCLEID (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20081028_global_network_initiative/.
109. GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011).
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The GNI is guided by three documents that make up its core
commitments: the Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy; the
Implementation Guidelines; and the Governance, Accountability and
Learning Framework.110 The Principles detail the broader goals of the GNI
in establishing a framework for companies to advance and defend
internationally recognized human rights through their business practices.111
The Implementation Guidelines expound on the Principles by providing
more guidance on how companies are to translate these Principles into
actual practice. The Governance, Accountability and Learning Framework
sets up a multistakeholder organization (governed by a board of directors),
which is intended to drive the program forward.112 This organization is
empowered to, among other things, recruit new participants, create
collaborative forums, establish a means for third parties to express their
concerns or questions, and to communicate with participant companies in
developing an independent accountability system for assessing company
compliance.113 These documents provide the structure and framework for
the entire GNI.
The Governance, Accountability and Learning Framework provides
for a three-phase timeline for the GNI to become fully operational. The
GNI just finished phase one, which lasted from 2009 to 2010.114 During
that time, companies focused on recruiting new participants and
implementing the Principles in their business practices.115 At the same time,
the organization was required to find and train independent assessors (to be
used later on in evaluating participating companies), and also provided
information and expertise to the participating companies as they
implemented their changes.116 Phase two began in 2011, during which time
independent assessors will evaluate and create a written report on each
company’s implementation of the Principles (also called a process
review).117 The third phase begins in 2012 and continues on from there. At
that point, assessors will be required to carry out a case review of
110. Principles,
GLOBAL
NETWORK
INITIATIVE,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2011);
NETWORK
INITIATIVE,
Implementation
Guidelines,
GLOBAL
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index.php (last visited Apr.
14, 2011); Governance, Accountability & Learning Framework, GLOBAL NETWORK
INITIATIVE, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/index.php (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
111. Principles, supra note 110.
112. Governance, Accountability & Learning Framework, supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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participating companies by delving deeper into the companies’ everyday
practices, assessing the effectiveness of each company’s policies and their
responses to government demands in Internet-restricting countries.118
Throughout the process, the organization and participants are expected to
continue to bring in new recruits,119 and, by phase three, the GNI should be
in full swing.
On its face, the GNI appears to tackle some of the critical issues
inherent in GOFA. The GNI attempts to address on a global scale issues
that GOFA sought to address through only the narrow lens of American
law. Likewise, the GNI creates a forum for disseminating information on
international laws and provides assistance to companies in order to help
them minimize their contributions to human rights violations. Most
importantly, it places all participating ICPs on a level playing field by
creating uniform guidelines for every company and enabling these
companies to work together to oppose government demands that potentially
compromise human rights.120 Therefore, on its face, the GNI appears to be
an effective alternative to some of the major shortcomings of GOFA.
However, some inherent problems exist in the GNI’s makeup that
could hamper its ability to meet its critical goals. Most importantly, while
the GNI seeks to be global, it is currently comprised of largely American
companies, organizations, and scholars.121 Further, it has only twenty-five
participants,122 and it has failed to gain commitments from Internet giants
like Twitter, Facebook, Amazon.com, and Skype.123 In fact, the only ICPs
that have actually signed on are Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft. The GNI
seeks to create a stronger pushback against Internet-restricting
governments, yet these three American ICPs do not hold enough market

118. Id.
119. New recruits have two years from the day they join to prepare for their first
assessment. If the GNI is already in phase three by the time a new participant joins, their
assessment will be comprised of both a process and a case review. Id.
120. For example, the GNI requires participating companies to give limited
interpretation to government demands that would compromise freedom of expression; to
seek clarification on government demands that are overly broad or inconsistent with
international law; to obtain written explanations from governments explaining the legal
basis for their demands; and to challenge demands in domestic court or seek assistance from
international organizations when demands appear to conflict with international or domestic
laws. Implementation Guidelines, supra note 110.
NETWORK
INITIATIVE,
121. Participants,
GLOBAL
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
122. Id. Interestingly, research began for this Note in mid- to late 2009, and the GNI has
only gained one new participant since that time.
123. Evgeny Morozov, Wiki Rehab: How to Save Julian Assange’s Movement from
Itself, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/81017/wikileaksinternet-pirate-party-save.
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power in China to be a sufficient force against government demands.124
While it may be too soon to declare the GNI a failure, if it cannot recruit
other ICPs, it is unlikely that it will be able to exercise sufficient leverage
to accomplish its goals. The GNI also needs more international presence
than it currently has, in order to avoid looking merely like GOFA in
disguise rather than a global code of conduct for companies.
One of the biggest criticisms of the GNI (and a large reason why
several international organizations such as Reporters Without Borders and
Amnesty International currently do not back it) is that the GNI lacks
sufficient “teeth” to get the job done.125 The language in the GNI leaves too
much discretion to participating companies in responding to government
demands—calling for companies to “assess the human rights risks . . .
where they operate and develop appropriate mitigation strategies to
address these risks” as well as to “[n]arrowly interpret and implement
government demands . . . .”126 While companies are responsible for seeking
advice when necessary, the language of the GNI provides loose guidelines
for companies, leaving too much to the judgment and discretion of
participating companies in responding to government directives.127 The
organization will publicize companies that are found in noncompliance
with the Principles; however, there are no real penalties set out for
companies that shirk their obligations.128 The GNI also does not outright
forbid companies from complying with government demands that violate
international laws, leaving many to argue that the GNI does not actually
124. Google’s market share, for example, has dropped to less than nineteen percent in
China. Brian Hindley & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protectionism Online: Internet Censorship
and International Trade Law 5 (ECIPE, Working Paper No. 12, 2009),
http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/protectionism-online-internetcensorship-and-international-trade-law/PDF.
125. Why Reporters Without Borders Is Not Endorsing the Global Principles on
Freedom of Expression and Privacy for ICT Companies Operating in Internet-Restricting
Countries, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.rsf.org/WhyReporters-Without-Borders-is.html [hereinafter REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS]; Bobbie
Johnson, Amnesty Criticises Global Network Initiative for Online Freedom of Speech,
GUARDIAN (Oct, 30, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/30/amnestyglobal-network-initiative. It does, however, appear hopeful that Reporters Without Borders
has at least acknowledged its support for these ICPs’ efforts in joining the GNI. Doug
Caverly, Reporterss Without Borders Names “Internet Enemies,” WEBPRONEWS (Mar. 13,
2009), http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2009/03/13/reporters-without-borders-namesinternet-enemies.
126. Implementation Guidelines, supra note 110 (emphasis added).
127. Johnson, supra note 125.
128. For example, while the GNI’s own website details what will be assessed in each of
its three phases as well as what will be publicly reported (including assessments of each
company’s compliance as well as any compliance challenges), it makes no mention of
penalties that will be exacted upon companies who are found in noncompliance. Frequently
NETWORK
INITIATIVE,
Asked
Questions,
GLOBAL
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/faq/index.php#42 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
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eliminate the risk of human rights abuses.129 In short, the success of the
GNI lies largely in the hands of the member companies to carry out their
responsibilities. Thus, while the GNI is a “step in the right direction,”130
several international groups are waiting to endorse the plan, remaining
cautiously optimistic about its success.131
While many have not completely written off the success of the GNI,
there are plenty of hurdles that the program must overcome before it can
prove its value. It is essential that the GNI recruit more members, and it
must find well-known, international telecommunications companies that
are willing to commit to its Principles.132 Further, to assuage the concerns
of many international groups that the enforcement provisions of the GNI
are too weak to discourage its membership from contributing to human
rights abuses, the language of the GNI should either be reformed to address
the weaknesses in its framework. Otherwise, the GNI’s success will
continue to depend on its participants’ mere promises to uphold the
Principles.

D.

The Global Compact

The Global Compact is a multistakeholder initiative133 intended to
“ensure that markets, commerce, technology and finance advance in ways
that benefit economies and societies everywhere.”134 Similar to the GNI, it
is a global initiative created in order to bring business practices in line with
internationally accepted “core values” of good business in the areas of
human rights, labor standards, the environment, and anticorruption.135
However, while the Compact has some definite strengths not present in the
GNI, it shares some of its very fundamental weaknesses, making it a useful
mechanism to improve company operations abroad but ultimately missing
the mark in offering a sound solution to solving the problems of corporate
complicity in China.
While the GNI is struggling to become a truly global initiative, the
Compact does not suffer from that same problem. It is a United Nations
129. See MacKinnon, supra note 108; Israel, supra note 14, at 651–52; REPORTERS
WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 125.
130. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 125.
131. See id.; Johnson, supra note 125.
132. In late 2008, the Guardian reported that the GNI was in discussions with British
communication company Vodafone, as well as with French Telecom. Johnson, supra note
125.
133. Deva, supra note 60, at 291.
134. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
135. The
Ten
Principles,
UNITED
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011).
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initiative and is in fact “the largest voluntary corporate responsibility
initiative in the world.”136 Since its launch in July 2000, the Compact has
attracted a significant number of participants and now consists of about
8,000 members, which include a diverse number of governments,
companies, and organizations from all over the world.137 It is guided by
“The Ten Principles,” which are based on core principles of international
law found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption. As such, the Principles are
truly a global response to reforming corporate business practices in a
globalizing market.138
While the Compact is made up of an impressive number of
participants, it has fielded some heavy criticisms regarding its
effectiveness.139 The Compact seeks to implement its objectives through
leadership, dialogues, learning, and networking,140 but it is does not act as a
regulatory body to ensure that its practices are being properly implemented
and followed.141 In fact, there is no mechanism in place properly to police
participant efforts nor does it penalize those that are not fulfilling their
commitment.142 Furthermore, the Principles are very vague and provide
little guidance to companies that wish to follow the Compact’s policies. For
example, Principles 1 and 2 provide that “[b]usinesses should support and
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights” and
“make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”143 Such
broad codes of conduct not only create potential problems for companies
looking to improve their business practices, but also make it easier for
disingenuous corporations to circumvent the code of conduct altogether.144
136. Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra
note 134; UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited Apr.
14, 2011).
137. UN Global Compact Participants, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
136;
Participant
Search,
UNITED
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants/search (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
138. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 135.
139. There is, in fact, an entire blog devoted to keeping a watchful and critical eye on the
Compact. See GLOBAL COMPACT CRITICS, http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
140. For an example of how the Compact is set up to promote its objectives, see
Analyzing
Progress,
UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/analyzing_progress.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
141. Deva, supra note 60, at 293.
142. Id.
143. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 135.
144. Deva, supra note 60, at 296.
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Despite its large participant base, many have questioned whether the
Compact is effective at changing business practices or whether it is simply
being utilized by corporations to “polish” or “bluewash” their images.145
For example, the Compact requires participants to submit annual
statements detailing how they are complying with the Ten Principles.146 If
companies do not submit these reports, they can be “delisted” or kicked out
of the Compact, and surprisingly, over 1,800 companies have already been
ejected for not submitting reports.147 Then, in March of 2010, the Compact
placed a one year moratorium on delisting companies due to concerns that
too many companies were being ejected.148 The moratorium was retroactive
(running from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010)149 and was intended
to allow the Board to “explore solutions to a systemic lack of disclosure in
certain markets.”150 However, after the moratorium was lifted on December
31, 2010, 200 more companies were de-listed, bring the total number of
expelled companies to 2,000.151
Today, the Global Compact is continuing its attempts to increase
transparency and to improve effective implementation of its policies by, for
example, developing (and publicizing) a grading system in which
participating companies are ranked based on their “levels of progress
disclosure.”152 Yet only time will tell whether these changes will ultimately
be effective, and many argue that the success of the Compact will remain in
question until it can definitively show that its policies are having a real
impact on corporate behavior.153

E.

Changing Gears in Combating Corporate Complicity

Ultimately, the Compact, like GOFA, the GNI, and the ATS, fails to
address fully the problems that arise from corporate complicity in China.
145. Hugh Williamson, CSR in Emerging Economies: Style Still Trumps Substance,
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 23, 2010), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/23/csr-inemerging-economies-style-still-trumps-substance/; Kenny Bruno & Joshua Karliner,
Tangled Up in Blue: Corporate Partnerships at the United Nations, CORPWATCH (Sept. 1,
2000), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=996.
146. Deva, supra note 60, at 298; see also Williamson, supra note 145.
147. Williamson, supra note 145.
148. Global Compact Board Addresses Delistings, Calls for Review of COP Procedures,
UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT
(Mar.
25,
2010),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/20-03-25-2010; Williamson, supra note 145.
149. Global Compact Board Addresses Delistings, Calls for Review of COP Procedures,
supra note 150.
150. Number of Expelled Companies Reaches 2,000 As Global Compact Strengthens
Disclosure Framework, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/95-01-20-2011.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Williamson, supra note 145.
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However, while many raise serious concerns regarding these ICPs’
operations, and rightly so, punishing ICPs or removing them altogether is
not the appropriate step forward. In fact, American ICPs need not be
viewed as the enemies. As will be discussed below, their presence in China
provides very tangible benefits. In the end, there are more serious concerns
pertaining to the system of censorship in China, and the ultimate focus
should not be on the ICPs, but on China itself.

IV. MOVING FORWARD: SCALING THE GREAT FIREWALL OF
CHINA
While there have been many alternatives proposed to address
corporate complicity with Chinese censorship laws, they focus too much on
making quick fixes and have the potential to push the issue in the wrong
direction—making matters worse, not better. What is ultimately at issue is
not simply ICPs’ complicity in China, but the broader issues pertaining to
China’s system of censorship. If we truly want to address corporate
complicity, we must do so in a manner that addresses the human rights
violations themselves. And if we want to improve Internet freedoms in
China, we must be realistic about what success can look like there—in
other words, we need to reconceptualize what it would take to bring change
to China.
It is important to keep in mind that, although China has steadily
become a super power with a population of approximately 1.33 billion and
a GDP of $4.9 trillion in 2009,154 it is still very much a developing
country.155 In fact, in 2009, its per capita GDP was only $3,650 per year,156
which is significantly lower than the per capita GDP of developed
countries157 (for example, the United States’ 2009 per capita sat at about
$46,360158). China has also experienced exponential economic growth at a

154. China, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (last visited Apr. 14,
2011). In comparison, the United States’ GDP was approximately $14.33 trillion in 2009.
FACTBOOK,
North
America:
United
States,
WORLD
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Apr.
14, 2011).
155. INT’L MONETARY FUND, RESTORING CONFIDENCE WITHOUT HARMING RECOVERY 2,
tbl.1 (July 7, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/update/02/pdf/0710.pdf;
Yu Zhongwen, China’s Developing-Country Identity Remains Unchanged,
(Aug.
13,
2010),
ENGLISH.XINHUANET.COM
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-08/13/c_13443881.htm.
156. China, supra note 154.
157. Jianguo Liu & Peter H. Raven, China’s Environmental Challenges and Implications
for the World, 40 CRITICAL REV. ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 823, 823 (2010),
http://www.csis.msu.edu/Publications/Liu_Raven_2010.pdf.
158. United States, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
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much faster pace than developed countries.159 Consequently, China has
become an economic giant but lags behind developed countries in many
respects.160 Its economic growth is expected to create “an unprecedented
shift that will create big challenges for every aspect of the urban systems,
including health, education, housing, energy, food, and water.”161 China,
therefore, is still very much a growing nation that is finding its legs. It has
seen considerable change, and it is sure to see more moving into the future;
however, it seems unrealistic to hold China to American or Western
standards of free speech and democracy and to expect huge changes in
short order. Similarly, it is merely conjecture to say that China’s notion of
free speech will not look more Western in the future.
The United States itself has seen its own free speech protections
evolve significantly over the last two centuries. The First Amendment was
adopted in 1791 and its protections have significantly evolved—waxing
(and waning) since the 1700s. For example, just eleven years after the
Constitution’s adoption, the Sedition Acts of 1798 were enacted to protect
the government against seditious attacks of those who opposed it.162 While
short-lived, these Acts were heavily criticized at the time for being a
significant abridgment on speech.163 In the 1800s, state governments were
denying speech protections to minorities,164 since First Amendment
protections were not even applied to the states until 1925 when the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed free
speech protections against state intrusion.165 Concerns over protecting
speech from government encroachment are still very much present today.
More recently, the Bush Administration fielded strong criticism for
enacting the USA PATRIOT Act. In particular, section 215 of the Act
(which gives the government broad powers to obtain personal records of
any citizen) has been attacked for the chilling effect it could have on free
speech.166
159. Liu & Raven, supra note 157, at 824.
160. Id. at 823.
161. Id. at 826.
162. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801) (“[I]f any
person shall write, print, utter, or publish . . . or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid
in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing . . .
against the government of the United States . . . shall be punished by a fine . . . and by
imprisonment not exceeding two years.”).
163. CHARLES C. HAYNES ET AL., FIRST FREEDOMS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN AMERICA 52 (2006).
164. For example, the California Supreme Court in People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854),
denied the right of Chinese Americans and immigrants to testify at trial due to their inferior
race. Id. at 84–85.
165. Id. at 48.
166. Id. at 227; see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 215 (2001).
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And the First Amendment continues to evolve every day.167 In fact, as
more acts of “cyber-terrorism” occur—like the publication of classified
documents by WikiLeaks—the government has shown more and more
distrust and fear of the Internet, making some wonder whether the U.S.
government may place increased restrictions on Internet speech in the
future.168 Senator Jay Rockefeller, for example, recently remarked that the
Internet is the “‘number one hazard’ to national security” and felt that “it
would have been better if ‘we had never invented the Internet.’”169
On the same token, China, in all actuality, is a maturing nation and
has not had as much time as nations such as the United States to develop its
laws and policies. As China grows as a country, the potential for change
will grow along with it, especially in its stance on speech protections. For
now, we must temper our expectations for China and understand that
allowing ICPs to maintain a presence in China will be more beneficial than
forcing them out.
Since change will likely only come with time, it is of the utmost
importance that American ICPs remain in China. Chinese search engines
are already dominant in its market (Baidu’s market share is projected to be
at seventy-nine percent for 2011),170 indicating that China could easily
maintain its system of censorship without any outside assistance from
American ICPs.171 Furthermore, even critics of Chinese censorship laws
admit that search engines like Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft provide
search results that are “markedly less censored than rivals like Baidu.”172
Likewise, since Google produces an error message on its search engine
alerting users when their search results have been censored, Google has at
least informed the public that they were being censored.173 Considering that
167. “[T]hroughout the nation’s history, all Americans struggle to achieve a balance
between security and freedom in times of national crisis from the Sedition Act of 1798 to
the USA Patriot Act of 2001.” HAYNES ET AL., supra note 163, at 12.
168. Teena Clipston, WikiLeaks: The Day the Internet Died, SUITE101.COM (Dec. 20,
2010), http://www.suite101.com/content/wikileaks-is-the-freedom-of-information-killingthe-internet-a323434.
169. Id.
170. Doug Caverly, Baidu Sets Sights on Market Share of 79 Percent, WEBPRONEWS
(June 8, 2010), http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2010/06/08/baidu-sets-sights-onmarket-share-of-79-percent.
171. Fahmida Y. Rashid, China Brags About Deleting 350 Million Pages in Web
Censorship Campaign, EWEEK.COM (Jan 3, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/CloudComputing/China-Brags-About-Deleting-350-Million-Pages-in-Web-CensorshipCampaign-418388/.
172. Ryan Singel, Google Uncensors China Search Engine, EPICENTER (Mar. 22, 2010,
4:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/03/google-uncensors-china-search-engine/.
173. In one instance,
[There was a] series of high-profile scandals in China . . . information that had
been censored by the government and, by default, search engines including
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these ICPs are not essential elements to facilitating China’s firewall,
removing them from the market altogether would not hinder China’s
censorship policies. In fact, forcing these companies out will only further
insulate the Chinese market. Maintaining a presence in China is crucial to
making any progress—and, at the very least, it is a glimmer of hope that
change is possible.
Recent developments between Google and China serve as an
illustration of how Chinese censorship may evolve. In December 2009,
Google was the victim of a “hack attack” in which hackers gained access to
the Google accounts of several Chinese human rights activists.174 The
attacks were suspected (and later confirmed) to be linked to the Chinese
government,175 and as a result, Google left China altogether on March 22,
2010.176 In a bold move, Google removed its Chinese domain, rerouting
visitors to its Hong Kong site, which does not filter its search results177—a
move that angered Chinese officials.178 However, what happened next
provides an interesting glimpse into the psyche of the Chinese government.
Rather than immediately blocking Google, China waited. About a week
later, China had neither permanently blocked Google nor revoked its
license.179 And despite blocking Google China on March 30, 2010, China

Google. . . . led some in China to turn to Google.cn, rather than Baidu, because
Google would at least tell people when information was being censored—even if
the information was missing.
Ryan Singel & David Kravets, Only Google Could Leave China, EPICENTER (Jan. 15, 2010,
11:28 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/01/google-china-engagement/.
174. Kim Zetter, Google Hackers Targeted Source Code of More Than 30 Companies,
LEVEL
(Jan.
13,
2010,
2:28
AM),
THREAT
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/google-hack-attack/.
175. Dean Takahashi, WikiLeaks Documents Lay Bare Vast Hacking Attempts by
Chinese
Leaders,
VENTUREBEAT
(Dec.
4,
2010),
http://venturebeat.com/2010/12/04/wikileaks-documents-lay-bare-vast-hacking-attempts-bychinese-leaders/.
176. Adam Ostrow, Google Redirects Chinese Site to Hong Kong, MASHABLE (Mar. 22,
2010),
http://mashable.com/2010/03/22/google-redirects-chinese-site-to-hong-kong/;
Rebecca Forbes, Google Pulls Search out of China, TICKER (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.theticker.org/about/2.8220/google-pulls-search-out-of-china-1.2219628.
177. Cade Metz, Google Redirects China to Uncensored Hong Kong Servers: Warns
Chinese May Block ‘Entirely Legal’ Move, REGISTER (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/22/google_redirects_china_to_hong_kong/; Young,
The Difference Between Google Hong Kong & Google China, FREE NUTS (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://freenuts.com/google-hong-kong-vs-google-china/.
178. See Google Angers China by Shifting Service to Hong Kong, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/mar/23/google-chinacensorship-hong-kong.
179. See Sam Gustin, Timeline: Google’s Dispute with China, DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 30,
2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/timeline-googles-dispute-with-china-came-downto-principle/19410114/.
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restored access to Google the very next day.180 This cat and mouse game
continued until June 2010, when China threatened to revoke Google’s
license if it did not stop redirecting users.181 Google complied and China
renewed Google’s license in early July 2010.182 While Google China is
currently still operational, Google refuses to censor information and,
therefore, only delivers results for limited searches such as on products and
music.183
China may threaten companies who do not comply with its strict
censorship laws, but the fact is, China wants Google there184—it wants
these ICPs operating within its markets. China’s hesitance to block Google
completely is a sign that its fears the effects of doing so would have on the
Chinese people. For a government that relies on its citizens for its
legitimacy, China does not want to block Google actively. The most avid
supporters of Google also happen to be highly educated and outspoken
citizens.185 According to one Beijing consultant, “To block Google entirely
is not necessarily a desirable outcome for the government . . . It’s going to
boil down to whether authorities feel it is acceptable for users to be
redirected to that site without having to figure it out themselves.”186
Furthermore, the public’s response to Google’s announced departure was
one of sadness. When Google initially announced its plans to leave China
in January, young Chinese citizens left wreaths outside Google’s Beijing
headquarters to express their dismay.187 Chinese citizens support these ICPs
and they hope that companies like Google will remain active in their
country. If its citizens want these companies to remain in the market, it
behooves China to keep them there (in whatever capacity possible) because

180. Jessica Guynn & David Pierson, Google Blames Chinese Censors for Outage, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/31/business/la-fichina-google31-2010mar31.
181. Dean Wilson, Google.cn Changes Landing Page as China Threatens Licence
Revoke, TECHEYE.NET (June 29, 2010), http://www.techeye.net/internet/google-cn-changeslanding-page-as-china-threatens-license-revoke.
182. Google Says China Licence Renewed by Government, BBC NEWS (July 9, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10566318.
183. Matt Rosoff, Google Admits It Wants to Return to China, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan 4,
2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-may-return-to-china-2011-1.
184. Post March, China seemingly was trying to avoid a Google exit altogether. Saibal
Dasgupta, China Persuades Google to Stay Back, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-persuades-Google-to-stayback/articleshow/5453590.cms.
185. Miguel Helft & Michael Wines, Google Faces Fallout As China Reacts to Site
Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at B1.
186. Id. (quotations omitted).
187. Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute over
TIMES
(Mar.
22,
2010),
available
at
Censorship,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html.
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it is within China’s best interests to keep its citizens happy. Blocking
Google would be a very aggressive move for China—a move, it is clear,
that it does not want to make.
Ultimately, the fact that China is cognizant of the importance of
having companies like Google in its markets and, furthermore, that these
companies seem to be making an important impact making it that much
more essential that they remain in China. But staying in China’s market
prompts the serious question of how to deal with the violations that occur
as a result of these corporations complying with Chinese laws. This
question will continue to be difficult; however, even proposals like the
Global Network Initiative and the Global Compact can play an important
role in helping these companies tighten up their operations in order to avoid
contributing to human rights violations. Google has kept (and will continue
to keep) its servers outside of China,188sheltering it from legal requests for
information on dissidents. Yahoo! appears to be following suit—when it
launched its new portal in Vietnam, it did not establish its servers there.189
Furthermore, the Great Firewall is far from impenetrable. VPNs
(virtual private networks) and proxy servers are useful in allowing Chinese
citizens to have access to information that is otherwise blocked.190
Likewise, users are misspelling words as well as substituting words that
sound similar to banned words as a means of getting around the filters.191
This bottom-up approach used by citizens to usurp the system will only
continue since the Chinese people are continuously looking for new ways
to get around China’s firewall.192 Interestingly enough, a niche market has
developed for software engineers who are constantly creating new
technology that enables users to circumvent filtering systems in order to
access information on the Internet.193
Finally, the World Trade Organization (WTO) may become a viable
forum for pressuring the Chinese government to stop heavily censoring its
citizens. Since China’s censorship practices could be deemed
anticompetitive and a restraint on trade, taking up grievances with the

188. Singel & Kravets, supra note 172.
189. Id.
190. Huus, supra note 31.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see, e.g., Michael C, Comment, Proxy Server in China?, YAHOO! ANSWERS
(June
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5:55
PM),
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070610104130AAi6Eh6.
193. Casey Kazan, New Tech: Twitter Developing Censorship-Proof Technology, DAILY
GALAXY (Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2010/03/new-techtwitter-developing-censorshipproof-technology-a-weekend-feature.html/; Atari, Finding
New Ways to Get Around China’s Censorship . . . For Now, REASONER (Oct 31, 2005, 3:23
PM), http://www.reasoner.org/archives/340.
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WTO may be an effective deterrent to continued Chinese censorship.194
Although some serious doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of
using the WTO,195 the Obama Administration is showing signs that it is
willing to use the WTO to influence China’s economic decision making.196
Ultimately, however, it remains to be seen whether the WTO will be an
effective venue for challenging China’s firewall.
In the end, while it is important to ensure that these ICPs are not
adding to the problem, what we really need to be concerned with is
achieving change in the long term. It is unclear whether China will
liberalize its policies on Internet speech, but the likelihood of such an
evolution is much greater with American ICPs in China than if they were
mandated to cease their Chinese operations. Though American complicity
in Chinese censorship is an unsavory thought, domestic and international
law should focus on long-term advancement instead of short-run flaws.

V. CONCLUSION
You are talking about [Internet] technology that everyone
acknowledges is critical for liberalization and democratization . . . In
our world, taking the position that if it’s not 100 percent, you shouldn’t
go in is just not sensible if what you want at the end of the day is more
human rights and [I]nternet freedom.197

What Google has done in China is somewhat provocative. An
American ICP has taken a stand against a major world power, and its
actions potentially have created a path toward change. China’s reaction is
noteworthy, and Google’s actions have unearthed a glimmer of hope that
China is willing to alter its ways. It will just take time.
At first glance, it seems per se objectionable, even repulsive, to argue
that American ICPs should remain in China’s market, complicit in its
censorship operations and potentially contributing to further human rights
abuses. But it is important to step back and understand that China’s notions
of rights and freedoms are still at the infant stage, but budding signs of
progress exist that foreshadow future progress. We cannot expect every
country to be the United States.198 Therefore, we must not view “success”
194. See generally Hindley & Lee-Makiyama, supra note 124; Daniel Indiviglio,
Fighting China’s Censorship Through the WTO?, ATLANTIC (June 24, 2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/06/fighting-chinas-censorship-throughthe-wto/20070/.
195. See, e.g., Indiviglio, supra note 194.
196. See Keith Bradsher, Sitting out the China Trade Battles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/business/global/24trade.html?_r=1
&src=busln.
197. Singel & Kravets, supra note 172 (quoting Leslie Harris, the president of the
Washington, D.C., advocacy group, Center for Democracy and Technology).
198. Even countries such as France and Australia have differing policies on what is
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in China in terms of American standards. We must rejoice in small
victories and encourage the Chinese government to increase openness
while encouraging American content providers to sustain and grow their
presence in the Chinese market. China’s response to Google’s latest actions
shows promise for the future and objective evidence that a watered-down
Google is better than no Google at all.
Recent news developments further justify exercising patience with the
Chinese government. On October 16, 2010, Li Qiming, the son of a senior
police chief, hit two female students while driving under the influence,
killing one of them.199 Initially, Li was remorseless and drove off, believing
that he would remain insulated from reprimand because his father served as
a local chief of police.200 In the past, Li may very well have escaped any
punishment;201 however, news of the hit-and-run ignited a public outrage
on the Internet, prompting Li to issue a tearful apology on national
television.202 Then, in January of 2011, Li was sentenced to six years in
prison and ordered to pay nearly $70,000 in compensation to his victims.203
Similarly, a Chinese web site called 703804.com recently has been
coined by some Chinese citizens as the new Chinese WikiLeaks.204 The
web site hosts various discussion forums for music, chat, and social
networking, but its most important function is that it facilitates core public
speech by providing a forum for local citizens to voice their concerns about
local problems, including government corruption.205 While the Chinese
government has taken the site down numerous times, it decided to approach
the site’s creator, Ye Zhe, a few years ago to negotiate.206 In exchange for
Zhe’s promise to temper political discussions on his forum, the government
agreed to allow the site to remain in operation.207 While some argue that
703804.com is a very limited victory for the Chinese people (as the forum
is strictly limited to discussions regarding local government corruption),
many others argue that the government’s tolerance of the site is a far cry
acceptable speech, yet they are still considered advanced, rather than backward, countries.
199. Father and Son Apology for Hit-and-Run Seen as ‘Show,’ GLOBAL TIMES,
http://www.lifeofguangzhou.com/node_10/node_37/node_82/2010/10/25/128797556981269
.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
200. See China Hit-and-Run Driver Sentenced to Six Years in Jail, BBC.CO.UK (Jan. 30,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12317756.
201. See Rob Gifford, Internet Helps to Hold Chinese Accountable, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133233065/Internet-Helps-To-HoldChinese-Accountable (click on “Listen to the Story”).
202. Id.
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from even a decade ago and is a “huge step forward in [attaining
government] accountability.”208
Ultimately, it is already apparent that conditions in China are ripe for
change. But in the mean time, there are no quick or easy answers to this
predicament. What is certain, though, is that leaving the market entirely
would be counter-productive to the ultimate goal of bringing more freedom
to China. If the United States truly wishes to see more Western influence
on speech-related issues, it only makes sense that Western corporations
should be allowed to continue operating in the Chinese market rather than
pulling out and leaving it to operate in isolation. American ICPs are in a
perfect position to take advantage of opportunities to increase the flow of
information into China. Their presence, therefore, is not only a short-term
boon to our tech sector but will continue to present very real opportunities
for growth. While it is certainly necessary to avoid further contributions to
human rights violations, big changes will not happen overnight. To “fix”
China, we must first embrace small victories and understand that a
satisfactory long-term solution is possible but that, for now, maintaining an
open dialogue can only work to accelerate the ultimate goal of bringing
Internet freedom to the Chinese people.
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